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 Who’s Afraid of Postmodernism?
Simon Blackburn
Many philosophers find it important to oppose the view known as “relativ-
ism”: the view that different perspectives on the world, or different languages 
or cultures, each have their own “incommensurable” truths. But it is surpris-
ingly difficult to combat relativism. I can illustrate the difficulty by telling of 
something that recently happened to a friend of mine. He was present at a 
high-powered ethics institute, which had put on a forum, in which represen-
tatives of the great religions held a panel. First the Buddhist talked of the ways 
to calm, the mastery of desire, the path of enlightenment, and the panelists all 
said “Wow, terrific, if that works for you that’s great.” Then the Hindu talked 
of the cycles of suffering and birth and rebirth, the teachings of Krishna and 
the way to release, and they all said “Wow, terrific, if that works for you that’s 
great.” And so on, until the Catholic priest talked of the message of Jesus 
Christ, the promise of salvation and the way to life eternal, and they all said 
“Wow, terrific, if that works for you that’s great.” But the priest thumped the 
table and shouted: “No! It’s not a question of if it works for me! It’s the true 
word of the living God, and if you don’t believe it you’re all damned to Hell!” 
And they all said: “Wow, terrific, if that works for you that’s great.” 
The joke here lies in the mismatch between what the priest intends—a 
claim to unique authority and truth—and what he is heard as offering, which 
is a particular avowal, satisfying to him, but only to be tolerated or patronized, 
like any other. The moral is that once a relativist frame of mind is really in 
place, nothing—no claims to truth, authority, certainty, or necessity—seem 
adapted to unseating it. 
Postmodernism is a celebration of relativism. It is the movement that has 
actively embraced the collapse of standards that it takes this to imply. It op-
poses the self-image of us philosophers, just as the sophists and rhetoricians of 
Plato’s day opposed him. 
We who work professionally with reason need to believe that we have a 
social role. And a satisfying role to adopt is that of the doctor of the soul: the 
cautious, correct watchdog of reason, the guardian whose job is to ward off 
the phantasms and superstitions of the night. British Prime Minister Harold 
Macmillan records going up to Oxford at the time of the first world war, and 
having his first philosophy lecture begin with the words: “young men, when you 
leave this place you will take up many professions. Some of you will go into the 
civil service; some will be lawyers, teachers, or businessmen. Some will go into 
academic life. Except perhaps to this last group, nothing of what I am about to 
say will be the slightest use. Apart from this fact, if you pay attention, and you 
are diligent, then ever afterwards you will be able to tell when a man is talking 
nonsense.” That is the kind of story analytical philosophers such as myself like.
To be a watchdog for reason, you must be able to distinguish its friends and 
its enemies. Many people think they can do this quite easily, and sometimes 
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they are right. We all think we can recognize unreason in the National In-
quirer, the flat earth society, in the religious right, in the 49% of Americans 
who believe that people are sometimes possessed by devils, or the three and a 
half million who believe themselves to have been abducted, at some time or 
another, by aliens. On the other hand we recognize reason in mathematics, 
physics, engineering, medicine, astronomy, tide tables. Other cases may be 
more controversial, and I am going to illustrate the difficulty by talking about 
one of them.
In the early summer of 1996 the postmodernist journal Social Text published 
an article by the physicist Alan Sokal, in an issue devoted to the “Science 
Wars.” All we need at this point to know about those wars is that a good many 
scientists had become irritated by work in the history and sociology of science: 
work that ranged from the very mild – suggesting, for instance, that the course 
of science is influenced by such matters as funding, or by professional ambi-
tions, or by traditions and habits and prestigious authorities, as much as by any 
inner logic of discovery – to the very spicy, suggesting for instance that science 
provides us with just one set of “narratives” among many, or that its theories 
do not admit of truth, or that physical reality is itself a social or linguistic 
construct. Those irritated liked to portray the historians etc. as ignorant of 
the science they pretended to describe. They felt they were being challenged 
by “a lot of kooky, anti-intellectual, politically correct, and subversive types.” 
The historians etc. said that this defensive reaction was what you would ex-
pect. The scientists were protecting their authority, their funding, and their 
importance. The sociologists and historians greeted the scientists’ protestations 
just like the panel greeted the Roman Catholic: if that works for you, that’s 
great. That in turn is not an explanation likely to appeal to the scientists. So 
sides had been taken.
This was the climate into which Sokal floated his article, which rejoiced in 
the rebarbative title “Transgressing the Boundaries: Toward a Transformative 
Hermeneutics of Quantum Gravity.” As the article was published Sokal re-
vealed, in the academic “gossip” journal Lingua Franca that it was a spoof or 
hoax. The article, in Sokal’s description, was written to test “whether a leading 
North American journal of cultural studies – whose editorial board includes as 
Frederick Jameson and Andrew Ross – would include an article liberally salted 
with nonsense if (a) it sounded good and (b) it flattered the editors ‘ideological 
preconceptions’.” If I may mix a metaphor, the editors rose magnificently to 
the bait, and received the egg full in their face.
The result galvanized, and polarized the little world of academe. The editors 
tried to regain their trousers, but with little success. Stanley Fish, the doyen of 
cultural studies, wrote in the New York Times defending them and attacking 
Sokal. Various social theorists, and historians of science said that Sokal had 
unfairly put their whole discipline on trial. But dozens of scientists and others 
crowed in triumph over the sight of those kooky, anti-intellectual, politically 
correct, and subversive types shown up for the frauds that they really are.
Sokal’s article is indeed a wonderful tissue of appalling stuff, and I have 
3
Blackburn: Who’s Afraid of Postmodernism?
Published by Digital Commons @Brockport, 2001
6 x 9
Who’s Afraid of Postmodernism?     37
no intention of defending the editors of Social Text, nor the genre that he 
brilliantly satirized. In fact, analytic philosophers of the kind I represent have 
been amongst the most virulent critics of postmodernist “theory.” We regard it 
pretty much as a sore on the western philosophical tradition. Our intellectual 
background is different. We owe our allegiances to Descartes, Locke, Hume, 
perhaps a small dash of Kant, and then the great lucid scientific philosophers 
of this century: Frege, Russell, Quine, Ayer and Austin. The postmodernists 
doff their hats in different directions: to Heidegger, or Foucault, or Lacan, 
Althusser or Derrida, perfectly unreadable continentals with an unfathomable 
devotion to Freud and Marx – an ideological devotion, capable of flourishing 
without any nutrition from the way of the world.
Postmodernism is a celebration of relativism. It is the movement that has 
actively embraced the collapse of standards that it takes this to imply. Here 
are some typical examples of postmodernist texts:
SARTREIST EXISTENTIALISM AND SURREALISM
Paul K. Pickett
Department of Sociology, Stanford University
Hans P. I. Sargeant
Department of Ontology, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
1. Gaiman and precultural capitalism
If one examines the textual paradigm of narrative, one is faced with a 
choice: either reject surrealism or conclude that the raison d’être of the artist 
is significant form. In a sense, several narratives concerning the role of the 
observer as artist exist. The subject is contextualised into a neopatriarchial 
nationalism that includes culture as a whole. 
The characteristic theme of Long’s[1] essay on Sartreist existentialism is the 
collapse, and subsequent futility, of postcapitalist sexual identity. Thus, Parry[2] 
suggests that we have to choose between surrealism and predialectic theory. 
Precultural capitalism implies that context must come from communication, 
but only if consciousness is interchangeable with culture. 
“Society is part of the rubicon of reality,” says Marx. However, Bataille sug-
gests the use of the capitalist paradigm of narrative to analyse sexual identity. 
If surrealism holds, we have to choose between precultural capitalism and 
neomaterial textual theory. 
“Narrativity is dead,” says Derrida. But Baudrillard uses the term “precultural 
capitalism” to denote a self-referential paradox. The subject is contextualised 
into a dialectic paradigm of discourse. 
Thus, if Sartreist existentialism holds, we have to choose between surrealism 
and postcapitalist nihilism. The subject is contextualised into a precultural 
capitalism that includes sexuality as a reality. 
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THE POSTMODERNISM GENERATOR
THE GENRE OF SEXUAL IDENTITY: MODERNISM AND 
STRUCTURALIST NEOTEXTUAL THEORY
O. John von Junz
Department of Semiotics, University of Illinois
Charles C. Hanfkopf
Department of Sociolinguistics, Stanford University
1. Expressions of stasis
“Class is intrinsically meaningless,” says Sartre. Bataille’s analysis of mod-
ernism suggests that sexuality serves to entrench hierarchy, given that reality 
is equal to sexuality. However, the primary theme of the works of Madonna is 
the role of the participant as reader. 
The futility, and thus the meaninglessness, of structuralist neotextual theory 
depicted in Madonna’s Material Girl emerges again in Erotica, although in a 
more mythopoetical sense. It could be said that Pickett[1] holds that we have to 
choose between the textual paradigm of narrative and neocapitalist narrative. 
Several theories concerning modernism exist. Therefore, if dialectic precon-
ceptualist theory holds, the works of Madonna are an example of self-sufficient 
feminism. 
1. Pickett, T. D. (1986) Modernism in the works of Glass. O’Reilly & Associates.
Well, these aren’t actually postmodernist texts. They are the beginnings of 
essays, coming from the web at http://www.elsewhere.org/cgi-bin/postmodern/. 
This site provides an original essay, every visit, written by The Postmodernist 
Generator, a program due to a student in the Monash University Department 
of Computer Science and “modified slightly by Pope Dubious Provenance XI 
using the Dada Engine, a system for generating random text from recursive 
grammars.” The pages are, deliberately, meaningless. 
So that’s the enemy, and a good one to fight it is. More than that, when 
Sokal went on to explain what his motives were, and who his targets were, 
much of what he said was true and appropriate. He lamented the general 
ignorance of science in the culture. He lamented poor science teaching. He 
deplored the superstitious ignorance of many Americans, and their tendency 
to believe in possession by devils, astrology, or the healing power of pyramids. 
He disliked “thinkers” who cannot distinguish, for instance, the question of 
whether solid states physics accurately describes things like transistors, from 
the question of whether military considerations motivated the research. Most 
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importantly, he feared that genuine left-wing political progress needs to mistrust 
postmodernism rather than welcome it. For example, it takes rigorous history 
to refute the fictions of reactionary and nationalistic movements, and a general 
disinclination to distinguish truth from fiction is no substitute. Conversely, 
belief that “postmodernism” has somehow deconstructed the very notion of 
truth is a convenient handhold for anyone needing to resist rational criticism, 
whether Hindu nationalists arguing against Western science, or right-wing 
historians arguing that there never was a Holocaust.
I thoroughly applaud these attitudes, and this choice of targets. So, my initial 
leanings are to the side of Sokal and the scientists, and against the wild writ-
ings of postmodernism. And indeed, analytical philosophers who till the same 
fields as I do and whose work I admire, notably Paul Boghossian, have drawn 
their own moral, which is very firmly on that side. We are the real guardians, 
and philosophy is only safe in our hands, and is not safe in the hands of the 
Continentals. We, analytic philosophers, believe in the real world, respect sci-
ence, worship truth, objectivity, logic, reason. They, the Continentals, do not 
believe in the real world, do not respect science, do not worship truth, logic, 
objectivity and reason. And typically they do not do so for the same reason 
that those other enemies of academic values, the religious right, do not do so. 
They want to politicize the issues. It is only by denigrating the proper values 
that govern science and inquiry that they can pursue their own outrageous 
political and moral agendas, without having to take notice of the real world.
However, the late Dr. Leavis said of a similarly polarized academic quarrel, 
“Here, the sides line up quickly, and wherever this is so we may suspect that 
the differences have little to do with thinking.” And although as I say many 
of my instincts are on the “scientific” side, or on Boghossian’s analytic side, 
which, slightly facetiously, I shall call the right as opposed to the social con-
structivists etc. who make up the left, I nevertheless fear that l’affaire Sokal 
illustrated Leavis’ dictum. Why?
First, although I am not defending them, let me say a few words on behalf 
of the hapless editors of Social Text. Remember Sokal tells us that his hoax 
tested the hypothesis that the editors would publish an article liberally salted 
with nonsense if (a) it sounded good and (b) it flattered the editors’ ideological 
preconceptions. And the implication of his success, he thinks, is that, since 
the article was accepted “a silent tide of unreason threatens to overwhelm our 
institutions of higher learning, and to dictate from a pulpit of blind, intolerant, 
righteous ignorance what we may correctly do, say and think.”
But is the description of the experiment fair, and does the experiment 
illustrate the threat?
Well, it is true as I have said that the article is liberally salted with nonsense, 
that it sounds good, and that it expresses certain kinds of “left” ideological 
preconceptions, which presumably belong to the editors. Sokal says, and I 
believe him, that “I intentionally wrote the article so that any competent 
physicist or mathematician (or undergraduate physics or math major) would 
realize that it is a spoof.” “Evidently,” he charges “the editors of Social Text 
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felt comfortable publishing an article on quantum physics without bothering 
to consult anyone knowledgeable in the subject.”
All this sounds bad. But let us look a little closer. The article comes from 
a Professor of physics. But it does not even purport to be an article on, i.e. 
contributing to, quantum physics. It purports to be an article explaining the 
philosophical and, potentially, the political implications of quantum physics. 
Now that may sound to be a fine distinction, but in fact it is not. Articles 
contributing to quantum physics are properly refereed by physicists. But an 
article purporting to explain its implications is a different thing. The editor 
of a journal of sociology or philosophy might suppose, surely, that a Professor 
of physics would get the physics right. Thus, to imagine a case which thank 
heavens never happened, when I was editing the journal Mind, had an article 
from a professor of history come in, purporting to relate, say, some contested 
aspect of Locke’s work to the English revolution of 1688, I would have had 
to assess the philosophical side myself, but I might quite well have taken the 
history for granted. That is what historians are supposed to be good at. So 
when, for instance, Sokal pointed out that the article talked of morphogenetic 
fields, “a bizarre New Age idea” that has no place in quantum gravity, and said 
nonsensical things about such matters as frames of reference, fields, locality 
or nonlinearity, I feel sorry for the editors, but not thus far scornful of them. 
If the physicists don’t get such things right, who will?
Things become a little more even when we realize, as well, that those on 
Sokal’s side are a little apt to misdescribe things. Thus, one of the most hor-
rendous pieces of nonsense, gleefully highlighted by both Sokal and by Paul 
Boghossian, involves a mathematical absurdity. “Later in the article” says Sokal 
in his description in Lingua Franca, “I propose that the axiom of equality in 
mathematical set theory is somehow analogous to the homonymous concept 
in feminist politics….even readers without mathematical training might well 
be suspicious of the claim that the axiom of equality reflects set theory’s nine-
teenth century liberal origins.” Indeed they might. Boghossian also quotes the 
passage, and uses it to show that the editors were guilty of publishing things of 
which they understood nothing. I am not of course denying that the passage 
is blissfully potty. But whereas Sokal says that it occurs “later in the article” 
and Boghossian says that it is a passage from Sokal’s essay, the truth is that in 
the obvious sense of the words, it doesn’t occur in the article or essay at all. It 
is buried in a footnote to the essay, number 54, which occurs after a gigantic 
eleven pages of dense notes (of course, part of what Sokal was parodying was the 
mishmash of notes and “references” that lend false authority to writings in the 
postmodernist tradition, and a good target it is). Still, it seems at least possible 
that the editors just didn’t get that far. Sliding something by in a footnote is 
not new. And, incidentally, although the footnote is quite indefensible as it 
stands, there is at least a discernible train of thought in it, namely that since 
Paul Coven proved in 1966 that the axiom of choice is independent of the 
other axioms of Z-F set theory, alternatives to Z-F plus the axiom of choice are 
possible; since there are alternative mathematics of the transfinite, it is possible 
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that there is something blinkered or in need of explanation, if mathematicians 
only explore one of them. Maybe the others deserve their day in court. That 
much, at least, would have been understood by Gödel, who in a classic article 
in the philosophy of mathematics, argued that only the unpopular hyperrealism 
about mathematics, known as Platonism, and which he believed in, justified 
the belief that there was one correct mathematics of the continuum.
But we are still quite a long way from the heart of the issue. To come closer 
to it, I shall mention another slightly tendentious piece of reporting. In the 
“science wars” the principal irritant to scientists is any suggestion that their 
work is other than “objective,” which they interpret as meaning that the things 
they describe are not “real.” When the sociologists etc. say, for instance that 
scientific reality is a social construct, a good red-blooded scientist is going to 
react exactly like Samuel Johnson, kicking a stone, and saying that thus he 
refuted Berkeley. Now near the beginning of Sokal’s article he includes things 
that not only “sound good” on this issue, but actually are quite good. That is, 
he includes an extensive quotation from Heisenberg, and a shorter one from 
Niels Bohr, each testifying that in quantum mechanics we cannot separate the 
reality observed form the process of observation. Heisenberg is quoted as saying:
We can no longer speak of the behaviour of the particle independently 
of the process of observation. As a final consequence, then, natural 
laws formulated mathematically in quantum theory no longer deal 
with the elementary particles themselves, but with our knowledge 
of them. Nor is it any longer possible to ask whether or not these 
particles exist in space and time objectively.
Sokal describes this as just a “controversial” philosophical pronouncement 
– perhaps part of the postmodernist haze. Boghossian says that “in support of 
[the constructivist idea] Sokal adduces nothing but a couple of pronouncements 
from physicists Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg, pronouncements that have 
been shown to be dubious by sophisticated discussions in the philosophy of 
science over the past fifty years.” The implication is that Sokal had picked up 
a couple of perhaps wild sayings by perhaps crackpot philosopher-physicists, 
now outdated.
Well, no. What Sokal quoted is the lynchpin of the “Copenhagen” inter-
pretation of quantum mechanics. The interpretation is debatable, certainly, 
and indeed has been the focus of intense discussion for more than fifty years, 
and formed the topic of the famous exchanges between Bohr and Einstein in 
the nineteen-thirties. But Heisenberg and Bohr’s view is not just dubious. On 
the contrary, it is actually orthodox. The Copenhagen interpretation is the 
dominant one, standard in textbooks, and accepted almost as gospel amongst 
working quantum physicists. It has been very widely supposed that Einstein, 
the realist, lost that particular battle, and that further results, such as Bell’s 
theorem, confirm that verdict. Realist, or so-called “hidden variable” theories 
exist, but at least until very recently have never been very popular, and I do 
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not think that sophisticated philosophical discussion has turned any tides here. 
So, far from taking in the editors with a way-out piece of crackpot philoso-
phy, Sokal was in fact appealing to authority as impeccable as any scientist 
could wish, in the murky field of the foundations of quantum theory. Even in 
a later postscript to his piece (Dissent, Fall 1996) Sokal continues to lump 
Heisenberg and Bohr together with “sundry physicists and New Age authors” 
as “vulgarizers” of the conceptual problems raised by quantum mechanics. But 
they are more than that.
The point here is that it is essential to the polarized debate that there is 
absolutely nothing to be said for the other side. The scientific capture of reality, 
objectivity and truth has to be quite flawless, and the sociologists etc. perfect 
crackpots. But Bohr and Heisenberg don’t fit in that picture, so it must be pre-
tended that they are merely a fifth column, useful only as a lure to flush out the 
madmen on the other side. Yet that is itself a serious distortion of the picture.
As an aside I might mention that an impressive case has recently been 
made for retaining realism in quantum mechanics, denying that there is an 
observation-dependent event of the collapse of the wave packet, but at the 
cost of accepting a static “block universe” view of nature.1  Unfortunately for 
those of a realist bent, on this account causation and time themselves become 
“perspective-relative,” constructions or projections from the perspective of 
certain kinds of being such as ourselves. One can imagine the Dr. Johnson 
response to that.
So, one must be a little cautious about accepting at face value all the 
flattering accounts of what Sokal actually did. What of the implications, or 
interpretation of his experiment?
Here once more we must be a little careful. To drive home the point that 
they really are insane, Sokal invites his opponents to try transgressing the laws 
of nature, which they are supposed to regard as social conventions, “from the 
windows of my apartment (I live on the twenty-first floor).” But this is poor 
philosophy, the tedious challenge to skeptics perhaps best answered on behalf 
of Pyrrhonists by Pierre Bayle: “they never denied, that in the ordinary Con-
duct of Life, men ought to trust to the testimony of their senses. They only 
denied, that the absolute nature of objects is just the same as it appears to be.” 
People refused to jump off high places long before Newton or Einstein, and 
our reluctance is no evidence for the status of physical laws. Heisenberg and 
Bohr did not make a habit of defenestrating themselves.
It is certainly fair of Sokal, or those on his side, to ask any social construc-
tivist exactly what he does think about the way in which science answers to 
experience. And sometimes the answers may be extremely poor. But that is no 
excuse for finding the question and the answer simple. In fact, on the “realist” 
side, the last philosophical movement to find the question and its answer 
simple was, I suppose, logical positivism which professed for a short time an 
attachment to “protocol sentences” – what Quine later called the fancifully 
fanciless medium of unvarnished news – and to a single, authoritative “logic 
of science” or confirmation theory determining how theory is supported by the 
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unvarnished news. But very few philosophers of science could now be found 
who subscribe to either part of that account, and for excellent reasons.
Does the success of the hoax suggest that a “silent tide of unreason threatens 
to overwhelm our institutions of higher learning, and to dictate from a pulpit 
of blind, intolerant, righteous ignorance what we may correctly do, say and 
think”? Evidently, if the sleep of reason creates monsters, the defense of reason 
needs to do so as well – here, the monsters of the PC police, censoring and 
silencing truth in the name of politics. Does poor Social Text fit this picture?
Perhaps. There is certainly a whiff of unreason about a climate in which 
the drivel in Sokal’s essay can get published in an academic journal. But what 
about the rest: the dictatorship angle? It is a strange charge when one thinks 
about it. The social constructivists etc. typically emphasize pluralities of speech, 
alternative ways of thinking and categorizing and reacting to the world. They 
are not in the business, one would have thought, of intolerance, but rather of 
toleration. Freshman relativism is a “don’t care” attitude, not a dictatorial one. 
Naturally, if it is just a question of political spectrum, the left has its censors, 
just as much as the right does. But it is hard to see why a philosophy that in-
sists, rightly or wrongly, upon the social construction of our ways of knowing 
the world, should ipso facto seem to be in the business of censoring anyone. 
On the contrary one might predict – and I think one would be right – that 
those who find epistemology easy and universal, who think that the World plus 
Universal Reason entail their beliefs, would be more impatient of alternatives. 
Historically, those who believe that they have a monopoly on truth are the 
ones who believe they have the right to silence dissent.
And in fact, because of their financial clout, scientists can be quite good at 
doing this. The April 8th 1995 issue of the journal New Scientist, for example, 
reported that the Smithsonian museum had to fight off attacks form Burton 
Richter, the President of the American Physical Society, and threats from the 
American Chemical Society to withdraw support, when it mounted an exhi-
bition on “Science in American Life” to which they objected. It previously did 
have to withdraw an exhibition marking the fiftieth anniversary of Hiroshima, 
when an alliance of veterans, congressmen, and scientists protested against 
inclusion of photographs taken in the city after the bomb dropped, and showing 
something of what atomic weapons do to things and people. There was no hint 
that the photographs were doctored, or untruthful, just that they showed things 
that certain spokesmen for science would have preferred the public not to see. 
According to the New Scientist report, the “Science and American Life” exhi-
bition was “balanced almost to the point of being innocuous” but this did not 
matter. By suggesting, for example, that “scientists are vulnerable to vanity and 
greed,” or that they sometimes work for the military, or by mentioning words 
like Bhopal or Chernobyl, the exhibition became anathema. Only uncritical 
worship is allowed. Against such a background, it is perhaps unwise to suggest 
that only the social philosophy camp have censorious leanings.
But let us turn from these melancholy events to some of the philosophy. 
What are the rights and wrongs of the postmodernist attack on cherished 
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notions like reality, objectivity, reason, and truth? Are these notions safe, but 
only safe, in the hands of scientists and analytical philosophers?
We could start in a number of places, but it may be convenient to fix on 
the publication of Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 
as a pivotal moment. In round terms we can see the history like this. Before 
Kuhn, it was possible to believe in protocol sentences and confirmation the-
ory. That was the darling of the logical positivists, the theory that would tell 
which beliefs or theories were confirmed by some given data. It would show 
how experience ought to generate belief. To transgress the norms of confir-
mation theory would be irrational; to obey them would be to be rational. But 
confirmation theory proved to be a broken reed. Even for Carnap, its greatest 
explorer, it was evident that the way confirmation worked was relative to the 
language in which things are framed (roughly, because the more hypotheses 
we can form, the less support the evidence gives to any one of them). Further 
problems – Hempel’s paradox, Goodman’s paradox – merely confirmed this 
kind of relativity. It seemed then that there could be no single authoritative 
algorithm for transmuting experience into theory.
Many philosophers and scientists took refuge in the Popperian solution, 
saying that what was good about science was not that it enabled you to come 
to believe what is true, but that it at least enabled you to reject what is false. 
There is a grain of truth here, provided we do not oversimplify what may be 
involved in falsification: the processes of scene-setting and background fixing 
necessary before theory can be brought into anything resembling naked con-
tact with experience. And provided too, that we are happy to see the actual 
applications of science as leaps of faith, akin to blind exercises of hope.
But in fact we do not think like that, and a realist like Sokal cannot recom-
mend that we do. Science is not a self-contained, self-referential hypotheti-
co-deductive game. It produces knowledge, but knowledge is not the outcome 
of the process Popper describes. And it is here that Kuhn showed a way forward. 
Instead of a pure mathematical algorithm, representing reason common to 
all, we find instead only heavily conceptualized human inquirers. These work 
within traditions, they select data, they work with a specific conception of what 
counts as a reason for what. They have had to learn what kind of theory looks 
promising, what simply won’t fly, what “paradigms” or models of how things 
are likely to be, to trust. The thing that transmutes experience into theory 
is not a shiny, a priori, stainless steel chute inside all of us, but nothing less 
than the whole specifically trained, shaped, and perhaps idiosyncratic human 
being, seeing things in whichever ways his or her language, experience, and 
traditions make salient.
Kuhn’s work chimed in with a great deal else going on at the same time, 
and pointing to the same morals. Wittgenstein’s work on language games and 
rule-following highlighted the contingencies behind the ways we see things 
“as” one thing or another, or see new applications of terms as cases of applying 
one rule or many. Quine highlighted the indeterminacies in translation, and 
thence in meaning. So people began to talk of different conceptual schemes 
not related by way of consistency or contradiction, but “incommensurable” 11
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with each other, talking past one another. And stepping from one to the other 
would be an act of conversion, a “paradigm shift” rather than accumulation 
or diminution of truth.
Kuhn himself never said clearly how his picture related to ideals of objec-
tivity and rationality. Was he implying that scientific theorizing was neither? 
Others certainly took that line. But in fact the connection is obscure, as I can 
illustrate with a standard example. Consider the enterprise of making a map 
of a landscape. Kuhn reminds us of the choices that are explicit or implicit 
in such an undertaking. A cartographer can make a geological map, a map of 
physical geology, an economic map, small scale, large scale, and so on. There is 
no one map of a landscape. And the cartographer’s enterprise is under-specified, 
if her instruction is just to map the landscape truly. Truly, yes, but how? What 
to select, what to leave out: what is salient, what is relatively unimportant? 
And that in turn will depend upon the intended use of the map.
Notice that none of this implies that there is no landscape, or no “real” 
landscape. On the contrary, the comparison of science to map-making is used 
by two of philosophy’s arch-realists, Leibniz himself (no scientific or mathe-
matical slouch), and the father of analytical philosophy, Frege. Nor does it 
imply that maps cannot be better or worse, more or less accurate, more or less 
comprehensive, more or less useful. It gives us a handy example of paradigm 
shifts and incommensurability, however: to visualize the landscape in the light 
of an economic map is just different from doing so in the light of a geological 
map. Not better or worse, just different. But to visualize it in the light of some 
maps – false maps – means going wrong.
I like the map-making analogy, but it can be attacked both from the right, 
and from the left. I shall begin with the leftist, or social constructionist prob-
lem with it.
Frege used the analogy to support realism, for the reality and independence 
of the landscape should not be in doubt. But why do we think this? Primarily 
because we have available an authoritative way of comparing maps with land-
scapes. Crudely, we go and look, and what we find, as we use our perceptual 
faculties on the landscape, either accords with the map or it does not. We 
can compare the two things, map and landscape, and if the one accords with 
the other, all is well. But if we are talking of our epistemological faculties in 
general, no such direct comparison ever happens, and since Descartes very few 
philosophers have believed that it does. None of the Cartesians in France, nor 
Leibniz, Bayle, Berkeley, Hume, Kant, Russell or Wittgenstein would think of 
perception like that. Now these are not kooky types, denying that you can verify 
a map. Rather, they are trying to give an adequate account of what verifying 
a map involves, and it turns out to involve, in their view, more than simple 
absorption of the landscape into the mind. Seeing the landscape, observing 
it, they would say, involves work of the mind: it involves seeing it as, for in-
stance, colored or cultivated or containing a westward strike of igneous rock, 
or whatever. We find some of these judgments easier to make than others, in 
the light of familiarity, training, interpretive traditions, or custom and habit. 
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We find some positions – that of looking, for instance – authoritative, and in 
their light correct hypotheses or descriptions made from less favored positions. 
But we don’t thereby escape from the human business of making judgment, 
into a different realm of naked confrontation with self-interpreting fact.
When we come to theoretical science, the problem of a “comparison” 
model is more obvious. If you have a theory, say, of the size or shape of the 
universe, you can hope, certainly, that it is verifiable or falsifiable in the light 
of observations. But these observations won’t be anything like a comparison 
of, on the one hand what the theory says (the map) and on the other hand, 
what the size actually is. Because the theory is the only arbiter on offer of what 
the size actually is. As it is often said, we cannot jump outside our own skins, 
or obtain an independent, objective point of view from which to determine 
how well our theories are mirroring the world.
None of this is “anti-science,” of course. On the contrary, the scientist be-
comes duly credited, not only with making observations or accumulating facts, 
nor even with dreaming up theories and mechanically checking them against 
facts. He or she becomes credited with creating ways of seeing: creating the 
very concepts, such as mass, acceleration, energy, and so on, with which we 
can classify and organize and appreciate the facts for what they are.
Still, the strand in philosophy known as “idealism,” of which “social con-
structionism” is a descendant, takes this ubiquitous work of the mind to suggest 
that the reality itself, insofar as we can understand it or do anything with it, 
is a “construct” of the mind. The real fountainhead is Kant:
Hitherto it has been assumed that all our knowledge must conform 
to objects. But all attempts to extend our knowledge of objects 
by establishing something in regard to them a priori, by means 
of concepts, have, on this assumption, ended in failure. We must 
therefore make trial whether we may not have more success in the 
tasks of metaphysics, if we suppose that objects must conform to our 
knowledge. This would agree better with what is desired, namely, 
that it should be possible to have knowledge of objects a priori, 
determining something in regard them prior to their being given. 
We should then be proceeding precisely on the lines of Copernicus’ 
primary hypothesis. Failing of satisfactory progress in explaining the 
movements of the heavenly bodies on the supposition that they all 
revolved round the spectator, he tried whether he might not have 
better success if he made the spectator to revolve and the stars to 
remain at rest. A similar experiment can be tried in metaphysics, 
as regards the intuition of objects. If intuition must conform to the 
constitution of the objects, I do not see how we could know anything 
of the latter a priori; but if the object (as object of the senses) must 
conform to the constitution of our faculty of intuition, I have no 
difficulty in conceiving such a possibility.2 
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(Kant, incidentally, was not given to jumping out of twenty-first floor windows 
either).
But the move from Kant to Kuhn is easy to see. If we continue to take se-
riously the contribution of the mind to the world-as-we-know-it, and we lose 
faith in the unique, a priori (stainless steel) structures that the mind imposes – a 
loss of faith encouraged by every development in science since Kant – then we 
end up emphasizing the way the world, as it is for us, is a “contingent” – that 
is, interpreted, social or linguistic – “construction.”
Well, that may not be the best way to put where we end up. Idealists have 
always had trouble finding the right words. They know full well that they have 
to deal with the “incredulous stares” of realists. The problem is to say that, for 
instance, photons or gravitation, or for that matter continental drift or the 
age of the dinosaurs, are “social constructions” without either sounding mad, 
or retreating to something bland, such as the uncontroversial view that the 
language with which we talk about them is a social construction.
Does all this preserve room for reason, objectivity, truth? Yes, but it may do 
so only at the cost of stripping them of some of their Platonic luster – taking 
off their stainless steel ornaments, as it were. Thus a plausible view, endorsed 
by Boghossian in his Times Literary Supplement article, is that we can divide 
the cake. It is a creative act, or a feature of a tradition, or in general contin-
gent and culturally determined which concepts or principles for organizing 
experience we latch onto. But there freedom stops. There is then no room for 
creativity, and it is the world itself that determines whether our application of 
those concepts is true or false. Our pre-existent actions generate rules, and the 
rules determine what we can now say. We form the rules, but what we predict 
by means of them is determined as true or false by the world independently of 
us. Meaning comes down to us, but then truth is down to the world.
There may eventually be something right about this view, surely, but as 
Boghossian knows, it is not only the kooky types who find the division of 
labour, to use his word, dubious. Many analytical philosophers, for the last 
thirty years, have doubted whether it is true because they have failed to see 
how it could be true. The difficulty is foreshadowed in the analytic tradition 
in work by Russell, Goodman, and Quine and clusters around Wittgenstein’s 
“rule following considerations.” The burden of his work is that you can envisage 
different learners, each given the same training in the application of a term 
to things, but who then surprisingly diverge in future applications. They have 
picked up different dispositions to apply the terms: it is as if they associate them 
with different rules, and we could say that they understand them differently. 
But such rules are not themselves uninterpreted realities that our practices can 
simply be seen to bump against. The rules are not there constraining practices, 
but are constantly re-read and refigured in the light of practices. Yet in the light 
of one rule, applying the term is correct, in the light of the other, incorrect. 
The problem with the simple division of labor is that truths are not assessable 
independently of understanding. There is no contact between mind and truth 
that is not contaminated by understanding, and if understanding is endlessly 
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reinterpretable, then so is any truth that we can articulate, which means all 
the truths we know.
I have put the argument at its most simple. In actually contested cases 
the application of a term will not be a matter of a particular individual’s 
“arbitrary” or subjective disposition, but of a collaborative, and competitive 
process, a political process. That is, the contending parties will be engaged 
in a public process of reinterpreting the history in such a way that their own 
solution becomes seen as natural or inevitable (calling a proposal arbitrary or 
subjective is in fact just a crude move in this practice). Each may claim to have 
identified a “core” of hard usage that supports only their preferred extension. 
But, according to the “interpretive turn,” and in light of the rule-following 
considerations, the selection of a core and a principle for extending it to cover 
this or that case is already an act of interpretation. This argument blocks an 
easy separation between anthropocentric, soft and culturally tainted rules, on 
the one hand, and hard reality and truth on the other. It looks as if, when rules 
go soft, applications go soft with them. So victory over idealism is postponed 
for another round.
This is not a “kooky” piece of theory, but a version of one of the oldest op-
positions in philosophy – that between Plato and the sophists or relativists, or 
between philosophy itself and its disreputable cousin, rhetoric. Plato believed 
himself to have won, but then as any historian would remind us, Plato wrote the 
history. Boghossian himself deploys, in his article, one very common rejoinder 
to the relativistic line of thought, the famous “peritrope” whereby Plato turned 
the tables on Protagoras and Gorgias. The argument is presented to someone 
who says, for instance that truth is relative to us or our ways. “You say that,” 
goes the rebuttal, “but then you must admit that my contrary statement, that 
truth is absolute, is true for me, or relative to my ways. In that case, there is 
nothing superior about your view to mine. Each is true relative to its own 
standpoint, and I am free to go on believing that truth is absolute.”
Versions of this argument have been popular in recent philosophy. Hilary 
Putnam uses it, while nevertheless himself steering perilously close to some 
kind of relativism. I am often surprised at this, for the argument was forcibly 
rebutted by William James, himself as lurid a social constructivist or relativist 
as you could find. James writes:
Only the believer in the ante-rem brand of truth (absolutism) can 
on this theory seek to make converts without self-stultification. But 
can there be self-stultification in urging any account whatever of 
truth? Can the definition ever contradict the deed? “Truth is what I 
feel like saying” – Suppose that to be the definition. “Well, I feel like 
saying that, and I want you to feel like saying it, and shall continue 
to say it until I get you to agree.” Where is there any contradiction? 
Whatever truth may be said to be, that is the kind of truth which 
the saying can be held to carry.3 
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James goes on to remark that the temper, i.e. the enthusiasm with which the 
definition is trumpeted is an extra-logical matter: “the humanist (postmodern-
ist, relativist) is perfectly consistent in compassing sea and land to make one 
proselyte, if his nature be enthusiastic enough.” The point is that enthusiasm 
for the definition or the approach can perfectly properly laugh at the peritrope, 
for the aim is not to show the absolutist that he is wrong, but to convert him. 
True, the issue becomes a political one, one of whose rhetoric or “force” over-
comes the other, but the postmodernist rejoices in that conclusion. He or she 
thinks that the movement from one discourse to another is typically political 
in its essence. It is never a case of “reason” as an abstract force winning, but 
only of ordinary human influences on mind and action. It was the opponent 
who wanted to see only the workings of objectivity and truth. So the Platonic 
defence against extending the relativistic view is, to use Boghossian’s own 
word again, dubious.
It would be nice if analytical philosophy had shown us a way out of this 
labyrinth, but I do not think it has done so.
So far I have been largely sympathizing with the “left” and doing something 
to puncture the triumphalism of the right. But naturally the left is just as capable 
of as much or more unreason. I suppose that the central monster to fight in this 
case is an inference. It is the inference from the bare possibility of alternative 
concepts, alternative classification, points of salience, paradigms, or traditions, 
to the view either that we know what these are like, or that we know that they 
would be as good as whatever is now on offer, or that what has kept the ones 
we do have working is “merely” a kind of conspiracy of elitist white males who 
have the right conservative power. Thus some radical feminists speak in terms 
of there being no “objective” science, merely a variety of perspectives, one of 
which – patriarchal science – has been “valorized” and “empowered” so as to 
preclude until now the possibility of a feminist science.
Now although James, or Kuhn, Quine or Wittgenstein may be taken to 
suggest that alternative ways of thinking are always possible, none of them do 
anything to suggest that they can be had for free. Wittgenstein’s comparison 
between use of a concept and the mastery of a technique may help us here. To 
adopt any scheme of description, be it of history, or nature, or numbers, involves 
sensitivity to the norms governing the scheme. The norms may, as we have 
admitted, be subject to indeterminacy, to reinterpretation, and to change. It 
may be contested what they are. But in our minds they have to be something, 
in order to distinguish the production of thought from the production of noise. 
A technique cannot be had for free: in particular it cannot be had without 
sensitivity to the distinction between correct and incorrect application of 
terms: truth and falsity. This is why, whatever else they are trying to say, no 
postmodernist is well-advised to deny a distinction between rigorous history 
(or physics or mathematics) and fiction. Doing so does not reevaluate thought, 
but denies its possibility.
Thus it may be true that in principle, someone might approach, say, the phe-
nomena of electromagnetism with a different conceptual tool-kit from Faraday 
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and Maxwell. So long as we have no idea what this way might be – and it would 
take a genius of Maxwell’s order even to begin to indicate it – then suggesting 
that Maxwell’s equations were arbitrarily selected, valorized or empowered for 
external, political reasons, is crazy. They were valorized and empowered first 
because they struck all those who had investigated electromagnetic phenomena 
as working, and second because they were, and remain, the only game in town.
(Similarly, suggesting that a new way of thinking about electromagnetism 
would inevitably be of help to progressive political causes is equally crazy. Far 
the most likely upshot of any such new way would be that its actual equations 
have no political implications at all, for the same reason that pure theory in 
other non-social sciences has none. The social order is not the topic of physics. 
But that is not to say that the enterprise of producing it, or that of applying it, 
would have no social and political implications, and in fact of course it would, 
just like any other human activity).
I want to conclude by cutting one philosophical layer deeper than we have 
done so far. It is quite clear in these battles that very powerful emotions are 
engaged: emotions perhaps disproportionate to the strength of the arguments 
on offer. How should we think about this? I suggest that a useful comparison 
is with a well-known “gestalt switch” that can happen in our personal inter-
actions, highlighted by Peter Strawson in his famous article “Freedom and 
Resentment.” Suppose I am earnestly putting forward my view of something to 
someone. They are supposed to be listening, to be evaluating what I say, to be 
thinking whether they share my approach, share my attitudes and beliefs. But 
suppose instead that I become aware that they are regarding me “objectively,” 
like a specimen or a phenomenon: someone, or perhaps better some thing that 
is there, as Strawson put it, to be “manipulated, controlled, or managed.” They 
regard my words not as potential bearers of truth or falsity, but as the causal 
upshot of forces of which I know nothing, like symptoms of an unsuspected 
disease. This is, in a very obvious way, the stuff of nightmare. By so regarding 
me they strip me of my humanity. It is as if I am mad. If all the world were deaf 
to my voice in this way, I would doubtless actually go mad.
The scientist, I am suggesting, or the rigorous historian, or for that matter 
the analytic philosopher, feels this fear when confronted with the historian 
or sociologist. They feel like an adolescent earnestly explaining the virtues 
of his or her style of life, and realizing that their parents are not listening, 
only appearing to do so insofar as this helps to calm the animal. Similarly the 
postmodernist comes on as having seen through the actual content – if indeed 
there is any – of what is being put forward, to the real plane, conceived as that 
of social forces or hormones or other causes, that lie behind the production 
of speech or text. Suddenly, instead of my remarks mattering because they 
represent a view of nature, they are diagnosed as symptoms of my place in the 
social order: the sayings you would expect from a middle class white male of 
a certain age, for instance. 
No wonder, then, that the stakes are high. These monsters represent one of 
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our deepest fears, the fear of being stripped of humanity. We can do it to each 
other. But we shouldn’t, until the process of understanding – the process of 
seeing the matter as the person who is being interpreted sees it – has ground 
to a halt. It is only then that the external, objectifying stance is called upon, 
to provide an explanation that the actual conduct of the discipline fails to 
provide. As Collingwood clearly saw, it is only the failures of science and his-
tory and other subjects, at particular periods, that call for the “objectifying” 
stance. If, for example, a culture holds beliefs about some matter of fact that 
bear no relation to the truth, then, but only then, we have to look to other 
explanations of why they held them. The postmodernist may be at fault for 
objectifying too quickly the scientist or historian. But then, the scientist or 
historian may be at fault for doing it to the postmodernist: for supposing, say, 
that it only social or political factors in the academy that cause the popularity 
of feminist or other standpoints. (I came across a splendid recent example of 
this pointed out by the reviewer of a book by the anti-feminist writer Christine 
Hoff Sommers. The reviewer pointed out that having inveighed against social 
and political explanations of the acceptance of beliefs, Hoff Sommers goes on 
to speculate about why feminists and others go in for such explanations, and 
cites, not surprisingly, social and political explanations of the kind she has 
just been discounting).
The standpoint from which you advance explanation without understanding 
denies the human standpoint, the standpoint of Geisteswissenschaften rather 
than Naturwissenschaften. But the standpoint of human thought is a delicate 
and amazing thing, the more wonderful the more we think about it. We should 
thank the Kuhns and Wittgensteins, Quine and James and their successors, 
for reminding us of the wonderful nature of the reasoning, truth seeking and 
truth-delivering person. And if we feel proper gratitude, I think we will find 
that we are surrounded by persons, not monsters.
What can we learn from this little storm? Perhaps an old moral, voiced
In the New Essays on Human Understanding. Leibniz gives his spokesman 
Theophilus a speech which starts by echoing Locke’s views on toleration:
What we are justified in censuring are not men’s opinions but their 
immoderate condemnation of the opinions of others…
But Leibniz qualifies his liberalism:
An exception should be made of opinions which advocate crimes 
which ought not to be tolerated; we have the right to stamp these 
out by stern measures – even if the person who holds them cannot 
shake himself free of them – just as we have the right to destroy a 
venomous beast, innocent as it is. But I am speaking of stamping 
out the sect, not the men, since we can prevent them from doing 
harm and preaching their dogmas.4 
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We might find the qualification more sinister than the toleration. And it is 
certainly easy to believe that one’s opponents are committing crimes against 
reason. The scientists will believe it of the postmodernists. And they will believe 
it not of scientists practicing science, but of scientists practicing the religion 
of science and the defence of its economic and political hegemony. Standing 
in the middle is extremely dangerous, but I fortify myself by believing that it 
is the only place from which no monsters are visible, which also makes it the 
reasonable place to be.
The University of Cambridge
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